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At its sitting of 20 May 1980 the European Parliament referred to 
the Political Affairs Committee the motion for a resolution tabled by 
Mr d'Ormesson, Mr Blumenfeld, Mr Bersani, Mr Schall and Mr Penders, on 
behalf of the Group of the European People's Party (C-D Group), and 
Mr de Courcy Ling and Mr Hutton, on behalf of the European Democratic 
Group to wind up the debate onoral question 1-30/80/rev., on 
thesurveillance and protection of shipping routes for supplies of 
energy and strategic materials to the countries of the European 
Community (Doc. 1-119/80). 
At its meeting of 29/30 May 1980 the committee appointed 
Mr Diligent rapporteur. 
The committee considered the motion for a resolution at its 
meetingsof 20-22 OCtober and 26-28 November 1980 and adopted it during 
the latter meeting by 20 votes to 12. 
Present: Mr Rumor, chairman~ Mr Haagerup, vice-chairman~ Mr Diligent, 
rapporteur~ Mrs Baduel-Glorioso (deputizing for Mr Berlinguer), 
Mr Beyer de Ryke (deputizing for Mr Bettiza), Mr Blumenfeld, Mrs Cassanmagnago-
Cerretti, Mr Damse~ux, Mr Deschamps (deputizing for Mr Klepsch), Lord Douro 
(deputizing for Lord Bethell), Mr Fergusson, Mr B. Friedrich, Mr Galluzzi 
(deputizing for Mr Segre), Mr Habsburg, Mr Banach, Mrs Hammerich, 
Mrs van den Heuvel, Mr c. Jackson, Mrs Lizin (deputizingmr Mr Van Miert), 
Mr Lomas, Mr Mertens (deputizing for Mr Tindemans), Mr van Minnen (deputizing 
for Mr Cariglia), Mr d'Ormesson (deputizing for Mr Antoniozzi), Mr Penders, 
Mr Prag (deputizing for Lady Elles), Mr Romualdi, Mr Schall (deputizing for 
Mr von Hassel), Mr Schieler, Mr Scott-Hopkins, Mr Seefeld (deputizing for 
Mr Brandt), Mr Simmonds (deputizing for Sir John Stewart-clark), Mr Simonnet 
(deputizing for Mr Seitlinger) and Mr zagari • 
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ANNEX: Motion for a resolution tabled by Mr d'Ormesson, 
Mr Blumenfeld, Mr Bersani, Mr Schalland Mr Penders, 
on behalf of the Group of the European People's 
Party (C-D Group), 
and by Mr de Courcy Ling and Mr Hutton on behalf 
of the European Democratic Group, (Doc. 1-119/80) •• 18 
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The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European 
Parliament the following motion for a resolution, toqether with explanatory 
statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the surveillance and protection of shipping routes for supplies 
of energy and strategic materials to the countries of the European 
Community 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr d'Ormesson, 
Mr Blumenfeld, Mr Bersani, Mr Schall and Mr Penders, on behalf of 
the Group of the European People's Party (C-D Group), and by 
Mr de Courcy Ling and Mr Hutton on behalf of the European 
Democratic Group to wind up the debate on oral question 
1-30/80/rev. (Doc. 1-119/80), 
having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee 
(Doc .1-697/80), 
1. Is fully aware of the high degree of dependence of the EEC 
which is obliged to import most of the oil and raw materials 
it consumes from third countries, almost all such imports 
being transported by sea; 
2. Is perturbed by the vulnerability of its sea links with Africa, 
the Persian Gulf and other parts of the world, since the North Atlantic 
Treaty does not cover areas south of the Tropic of Cancer in which 
the increasing seapower of the Soviet Union, both her naval forces 
and her merchant marine, presents a growing and.calculated threat: 
3. Points out that freedom of movement by sea is vital to the 
economies of both the EEC countries and the Third World countries 
with which they maintain relations and whose economic development 
depends on their ability to export; 
4. Notes with the greatest concern the continued armed conflict between 
Iraq and Iran, which, if prolonged and extended in the Persian Gulf 
area, could directly threaten the security of Europe's oil supplies: 
5. Calls on the Member States with naval forces to coordinate their 
patrols outside the zone covered by the North Atlantic Treaty 
and to strengthen their naval forces; 
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6. Points out that one of the European community's main concerns is to 
promote the economic development of the Thir~ World, which would be 
seriously and permanently jeopardized if int,rruption of deliveries 
were to lead to a scarcity of oil and a succ,asion of priee increases: 
7 • Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the 
' Foreign Ministers of the Member States meet~ng in political 
cooperation and to the Council and Commissidn of the 
European Community. 
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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
The motion for a resolution referred to the Political Affairs 
Committee was tabled by the Group of the European People's Party 
and the European Democratic Group to wind up the debate on the oral 
question by Mr d'Ormesson 'on surveillance and protection of shipping 
routes for supplies of energy and strategic materials to the countries 
of the European Community'. 
The motion for a resolution raises three problems: 
{a) It emphasizes the high degree of dependence of the EEC, which 
is obliged to import most of the oil and raw materials it 
consumes from third countries, almost all such imports being 
transported by sea: 
{b) It notes the disturbing increase in strength of the Soviet navy; 
at the same time there has been a proliferation of destabilizing 
operations by Soviet troops and their altiea. in Third Warl4 
countries: 
{c) It points out to liember States the value of coordinating patrols 
and of strengthening the naval forces of those countries 
possessing a fleet. 
The aim of the rapporteur has been to carry out a detailed study 
of the three problems raised on the basis of the most recent evidence 
available. 
I 
The EEC's dependence on its sources of supplies has already 
I 
been pointed out in the oral question to the Commission by Mrs MOREAU, 
Mrs LENZ, Mr FILIPPI, Mr JONKER and ~ de KEERSMAEKER on 'supplies of 
mfneral and vegetable primary materials to the EEC' (European Parliament 
sitting 14.1.1980). In 1973 Europe suddenly became aware that oil 
was its principal source of energy, and that almost all th~ oil 
consumed in the EEC (470 million tonnes in 1978, i.e. SSt of total 
energy consumption) was imported and transported by sea. It is 
equally clear that Europe would be in a vulnerable position if 
supplies of raw materials were discontinued: the Community's 
dependence on imports of raw materials is as follows: 
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100% for manganese 
100% for chrome 
100% for cobalt 
100% for platinum 
99% for tungsten 
99% for vanadium 
including 45% from the Republic of South Africa 
and 38% from the USSR 
96% from South Africa and Zimbabwe 
38% from Zaire an4 Zambia and 21% from 
the USSR 
82% from the Rep~lic of South Africa and 
16% from the USSR 
47% from China, 11% from the USSR and 
6% from North Korea 
78% from the USSR and 191 from the 
Republic of South Africa. 
A working party~e~ring the VIIIth French Plan has just issued 
a warning: although we are now acutely aware of the oil problem, this 
is not true of raw materials, particularly strategic materials. 
Although at the present time the price o! some of these materials has 
little noticeable effect upon the trade balance, cessation of 
deliveries would affect entire production prpcesses, in terms of 
either price level or output. In 1978, events in Zaire caused the 
price of cobalt to rocket. Manganese is needed in the production of 
ordinary steel and aluminium alloysr silicon is vital to the electronics 
industry, platinum is used as a catalyst in the petrochemicals industry, 
chrome is vital in the production of stainless steels, vanadium is used 
as cladding for nuclear fuel rods, molybdenum in the manufacture of 
specialized steels used by the armaments industry and cobalt, titanium 
sponge and zirconium are equally vital to the new technOlogy industries. 
T~ loosen the stranglehold of a dependence which could bring 
Europe to a standstill in a few days, it is of course possible to 
stockpile contingency supplies and obtain the cooperation of all those 
involved in a production process so as to ensure security of supplies 
at all stages. We must also make increased use of our own resources, 
recycle raw materials, prevent waste, and i~vest more money in the 
mining industry. However, all the Community's efforts to safeguard 
its lines of supply of raw materials will nQt be enough to guarantee 
its genuine independence. Freedom of movement by air and sea is 
also one of tha prerequisites for the survival of the Community in 
the decades to come. Trade with certain Third World countries, 
especially in Africa and the Middle East, can only be maintained if 
these strategic regions and their ma~ime a~proaches are not subjected 
to political and military destab~lizing operations with the·intention 
of severing -their contacts with the West. 
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Although it is impossible to be absolutely certain about the 
intentions of those in charge of Soviet foreign policy, it is 
undeniable that the Socialist camp has made a number of advances 
outside its traditional sphe~e of influence since the end of the 60s. 
The intervention on a massive scale of Soviet and Cuban troops in 
Angola in 1975 demonstrated two things: first, that having learnt 
the lessons of its failure in Cuba in 1962, the Soviet Union has 
acquired the means of transporting its conventional military forces 
from one part of the world to another very rapidly indeed. The 
Soviet Union has achieved Russia's traditional and historic objective: 
to cease to be a purely continental power and become a world one. 
Secondly, the victory of Communist forces in a country where 
Western influence was predominant has shown the Third World that the 
balance of power has been overthrown. The lack of any reaction fr~ 
the United States, not to mention European impotence, has reduced the 
West's credibility. 
Events in Ethiopia, the Yemen, Iran, the Lebanon and Afghanistan 
have demonstrated the USSR's interest in the Islamic oil regions, 
and consequently the dangers for Europe if the Soviet Union were to 
gain control of them. 
The motion for a resolution tabled by Olivier d'Ormesson expresses 
concern about 'the vu~nerability of its (Europe's) sea links with 
Africa, the Persian Gulf and South America since the North Atlantic 
Treaty does not cover areas south of the Tropic of Cancer in which 
the increasing strength of the Soviet navy presents a growing threat'. 
The Atlantic Alliance was conceived in 1949 with the aim of 
protecting Europe from Soviet attack in the theatre of Central, 
Notthern and Mediterranean Europe, but it is not designed to cope with 
the indirect threat developing at the confines of western Burope. 
The current massive presence of ships armed for interception and 
attack missions in all the oceans of the world is a reflection of 
the spectacular expansion of the Soviet navy. 
The balance of naval power (Military Balance 1978/79 by the 
International Institute of Strategic Studies in London) .is as 
follows: 
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Nuclear-powered 
attack submarines 
Diesel-powered 
attack submarines 
Large and medium sized 
surface warships 
Atlantic Alliance 
80! 
(USA - 70): 
127 
42Q 
Warsaw Pact 
85 
(all USSR) 
245 
This list takes no account of the armament, electronic devices, 
age or tonnage of the vessels. But it has to be acknowledged 
that the Soviet Union has amply made up for its former·inferiority 
in naval strength. 
The appearance of Soviet aircraft carriers, and the commisaioning 
on 23 May 1980 of the first Soviet nuclear-powered cruiser, the Kirov, 
show that the Soviet Union is continuing to improve the quality of 
its ships, especially as regards their to~age, armament an4 
operational capability. 
On 1 October 1979 the Soviet Union haC'l 2, 345,·000 tone of o·Oftll)at: 
vessels in service, while the American na~ had 2,229,800 tona• 
In 1964, 95 Soviet ships passed through the Turkish straits 
each year~ this figure is now 225. Over the same period, Soviet 
naval presence in the Mediterranean has increased from 1,500 ship/days 
per annum to 18,500. 
I 
There are a number of geographical constraints on the Soviet 
navy: Soviet ships have four home bases: Murmansk, Leningrad, Odeaaa 
and Vladivostok. The passages to these four bases, i.e. the pass·age 
between Greenland, Iceland and Scotland, the Skagerrak, the 
Dardanelles and the Japanese archipelago, can either be blocked or 
easily patrolled. The remoteness of the bases and the vulnerability 
of supply lines make it necessary for Sovi~t ship$ to have facilities 
(anchorage, ports of call, dry docks) in the various regions of the 
world where they happen to be operating. 
This largely explains the constant diplomatic efforts on the part 
of the Soviet Union towards the governments of the southern Mediterranean 
countries and of African countries situated on the Cape route ana · 
the Indian Ocean. 
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There is a close link between the different ways in which the 
Soviet presence manifests itself in the Third World countries, 
ranging from occupation by armed force to economic and military 
cooperation and to the presence of a powerful fleet patrolling 
the approaches to strategic zones. 
Freedom of movement by s•a is vital to the very existence of 
the European Community, which is the major trading power in the world 
and whose inhabitants depend for their high standard of living upon 
a high level of activity in the manufacturing and processing industries 
and in trade. The development of Third World countries depends upon 
continued trading links with the West and with Europe in particular. 
A war severing shipping routes would have disastrous consequences 
not only for the free world but for developing countries. In 1939, 
Germany had 56 submarines, today the USSR has 219 attaok submarines 
of which 85 are nuclear-powered. 
With this two-fold vulnerability caused bY her dependence and by . 
a strong naval and potentially hostile soviet presence on her external 
shipping lanes, what can Europe do? 
III 
The resolution referred to the Political Affairs Committee 'calls 
on the community insti~utions to invite the Member States with naval 
forces to coordinate their patrols and boost their ship-bUilding 
industries'. 
• 
The rapporteur would first make the followinq formal observation: 
since it seems pointless for an institution such as the European 
Parliament to address a request to the European institutions of which 
it is itself one, the most appropriate formula might be: 
the European Parliament ••• requests Member States poasessinq etc •••• ' 
It is the opinion of the rapporteur that only the Member States are 
in a position to take the necessary steps for the coordination of 
,patrols mentioned in the resolution by concerted inter-governmental 
action. The starting point for this concerted action at the technical 
level could be the EPC (European Political Cooperation) and the 
necessary impetus could be provided by the European Council or the 
Council of Ministers meeting in political cooperation. 
There are several fundamental arguments in favour of the proposal 
put forward in the motion for a resolution: 
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(a) The course of international negotiations on the law of the sea 
should encourage the EEC as an entity to protect the EEZ 
(exclusive economic zones) lying within the 200 nautical miles 
ovel:' which the states of the EEC will have aovereignty from 
third countries. Surveillance and policing patrols designed 
to protect installations related to the exploitation of resources 
in the seabed, to ensure that the rules relating to fishing 
policy are respected, and to combat pollution, could b~ carried 
out by the coordinated efforts of the various coastguard fleets 
of European countries with a seaboard. 
(b) There has been coordination between European fleets as shown 
by the joint exercises carried out by the member countries of 
the Atlantic Alliance. For example the 'DAWN PATROL' naval 
manoeuvres took place in the central Mediterranean between 5 and 
17 May 1980 involving the navies of seven NATO countries 
(Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, Italy, 
Turkey, Great Britain, USA) as well as French ships belonging 
to the Toulon fleet. The purpose of this exercise was to test 
the protection of the naval lines of supply in the Mediterranean. 
It has now been announced that the American Government has just 
warned its allies that it will perhaps be forced to take some 
ships from the Mediterranean Sixth Fleet to reinforce its naval 
strength in the Persian Gulf. 
Similarly, France has invited the navies of five NATO countries 
(Canada, USA, Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, Great 
Britain) to take part in joint naval.air and sea exercises in 
the Atlantic known as SOUTH-WEST 80. The theme of this manoeuvre. 
is the protection of theshipping routes threatened by air, 
surface and submarine attacks. 
There is a growing feeling within the Alliance that each Member 
State can only hope to safeguard its share of external maritime 
trade if it is prepared to coordinate its military efforts with 
its partners in the Alliance, since each state does not have the 
strength to provide its own naval protection (Admiral Jean Lannuzel, 
chief of staff of the French navy, quoted in 'Le Monde' on 30 May 
1980). Joint protection will be all the more effective in the 
context of the EEC in that it will result from systematic 
coordination at the technical as well as the political level 
on the division of responsibilities. 
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(c) The rapporteur is convinced that the prerequisites for the 
defence of strategic interests common to the EEC countries are 
better coordination and greater armaments effort, and this 
conviction has been reinforced by the fact that the Assembly of 
the Western European Union has just adopted the same position. 
In adopting the draft recommendation 'on the application of the 
Treaty of Brussels following the invasion of Afghanistan by 
the Soviet Union', (document 836, 26th Ordinary Session-
3 June 1980), by 55 votes to 6 with 2 abstentions, the Assembly 
of the WEU has asked the Council to 'delete paragraph 5 of 
Annex III of Protocol III of the WEU Treaty'. The provision in 
quest.. ion ~eeks i::o llmi t sh:•_p-bui lding in Germar..y to 8 df:_s-troy~rs, 
while other surface combat vessels must be of no more than 3,000 
tons and auxiliary vessels of no more than 6,000 tons. Submarines 
are currently limited to 1,800 tons and may not be nuclear-powered. 
If the WEU could obtain government approval for the removal of 
these restrictions and bans, the Federal Republic of Germany would 
-be able to increase the size and quality of its navy, which would 
strengthen Europe's overall potential. Secondly, the WEU points 
out that so far the German navy has been assigned exclusively to 
SACEUR (apart from one destroyer assigned to STANAVFORLANT), 
which effectively limits it to the Baltic and to the western coast 
of Denmark; the Union also recommends that 'henceforth German 
naval forces should be assigned to all NATO commands as needed 
and according to units'. 
The WEU rapporteur adds that the Treaty of Paris contains no 
provision limiting the geographical patrol area of German warship-, 
as evidenced by the courtesy visit currently being made by two 
German destroyers, accompanied by two support vessels, to certain 
parts of the Indian Ocean. 
IV 
Europeans have only recently become aware of Europe's vulnerability 
in the event of an interruption in its supplies, and this awareness is 
still insufficiently widespread. But it was Lenin himself who emphasized 
the weakness of a Europe whose industrial development in the 19th 
century was largely based on the exploitation of natural resources 
coming from overseas colonial empires. (In this respect it is significant 
that Russia is the only European nation in the 20th century which has not 
been obliged to relinquish her colonies and, on the contrary, took 
advantage of the Second World War to extend her possessions on her 
western frontiers. Is it because there is no ocean between the foreign, 
• 
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non-European populations (Turkmens, Uzbeks, Mongols etc.) and the 
white, Russian population that the latter has not been forced to withdraw 
from the colonial territories acquired under Tsarism in the same way 
that all other European powers have had to? Do possessionahave to be 
overseas to be colonies?) 
Due to long and active participation in the world division of labour 
industrialized Western Europe has become the most important commercial 
power in the world but has failed to recognize the implications of this. 
This strength can also be its greatest weakness. 
To evaluate the European Community's dependence and t0 encourage 
Member States to find means of safeguarding their sources of supply, 
we shall consider three possible general hypotheses/scenaries as 
envisaged by experts and listed in order of importance. 
1. Interruption in supplies at source 
Taking advantage of the instabilities of existing political r6gimes 
in Middle-East and African countries which have good relations with 
the West, revolutionary movements (Marxist-Islamic) supported by the 
Soviet Union or their allies take power by violent means (coups d'6tat, 
assassinations, border wars). 
One of the first acts of the new governments is to reduce and then 
discontinue production and export of oil or strategic materials bound 
for the West. By making the lifting of this embargo dependent upon the 
satisfaction of overtly political demands (Middle-East settlement) or 
claiming to question the traditional relationship with the 'capitalist, 
imperialist' world, the revolutionary governments force the importing 
States to take immediate emergency measures: using up existing stocks, 
implementing plans formulated by the International Energy Agency, 
rationing; many signs of strain become apparent in the economic structure 
of European countries and Japan, which have found it difficult to cope 
with the astronomical rise in world prices when a large part of their 
supplies is cut off. Irritated by the shortages, public opinion 
encourages governments to take measures to re-establish the status quo. 
Only the threat of direct military intervention seems likely to prevent 
a worsening of an internal situation so serious that the very democratic 
and liberal political system is at risk. But while Western countries 
preparefor external intervention, the Soviet Union lets it be known that, 
under mutual aid agreements with the revolutionary states which have 
imposed the embargo, any attack against these territories will be con-
sidered as an attack on ita own security. 
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Having no nuclear means of reply to the SS 20s deployed against it 
by the Soviets, Europe allows itself to be intimidated by Moscow's 
nuclear blackmail. Having its.own resources and access to those of 
neighbouring territories, the United States regards itself as less 
directly affected by the interruption in supplies, and sees the 
situation as an expression of West-South tension. Washington will 
encourage the Europeans to work out the basis for a global arrangement 
with Moscow on the sharing of raw materials between COMECON, Western 
Europe and Arab and African Third World countries. A pan-European 
conference is organized. The right of the Soviet Union to control 
the flow of trade in raw materials and energy from the Middle East 
and Africa and bound for the whole of Europe is recognized. In return 
for Soviet naval 'protection' on the shipping routes, Europeans are 
obliged to ask the United States to effect a considerable reduction 
in their military presence in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. 
The Member States of the EEC sign a series of bilateral economic, 
technological and financial agreements with COMECON. Little by little 
the Community loses its identity. Most decisions by European 
governments are taken after consultation with the Soviet authorities. 
There is no need to describe in detail the further stages of 
the progressive neutralization of Western Europe. The logical conclusion 
of this scenario is that the Socialist camp would gain political 
domination over Europe, withoutNATO and Warsaw pact forces being 
brought into direct confrontation. Soviet strategic parity with the 
United States would lead to a weakening of the American defence 
guarantees which Europe has enjoyed for 30 years. 
2. Shipping routes cut as a result of armed intervention at sea 
The second scenario is based on a different hypothesis. Unable to 
exert sufficient influence on the governments of raw material-producing 
countries of the Third World to force them to discontinue their supplies, 
the Soviets decide on direct action by cutting the shipping routes 
from the Strait of Hormuz or from any geographical point they choose 
e.g. the Mozambique Channel, the Cape of Good Hope if, whether it liked 
it or not, the Republic of South Africa was forced to provide facilities 
for Soviet ships, and the South Atlantic, etc ••• Unable to use these 
routes, oil tankers and cargo ships bound for Europe turn to the navies 
of Western countries for protection. But despite having no peace-time 
plans for coordination in zones outside the area covered by the North 
Atlantic Treaty, the latter put in an appearance in the areas of tension. 
But in view of their lack of numbers, disparity, unpreparedness for 
intervention missions in the absence of local bases and appropriate 
logistic facilities, the European navies are inferior to the Soviet 
navy. Only the United States' navy is strong enough to challenge it. 
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Concerned at the prospect of direct confrontation between units 
of their respective navies, Moscow and Washington agree to avoid 
the risks of escalation. Powerless to prevent the Soviet blockade, 
the Member States of the Community hesitate to engage in naval 
hostilities. The lack of coordination between the two most powerful 
navies, those of France and Great Britain, reduces the Community's 
operational capacity. 
When a sufficient time has elapsed to allow European stocks to 
run out, the USSR and Europe enter into negotiations leading to the 
concessions already mentioned in the previous hypothesis. 
3. War at·sea accompanying and aggravating direct confrontation 
in the European theatre 
The third scenario assumes conflict in Europe between Warsaw Pact 
and NATO forces. The offensive begins in one of three zones - in 
Southern, Central or Northern Europe, or simultaneously on an extended 
front from the Baltic to the Adriatic. At the very onset of hostilities 
the Soviets may use their SS 20 nuclear weapons to hit the main targets 
in Western Europe (cities or economic centres) at the same time 
reducing their capacity to reply. This possibility, which Soviet 
doctrine has not discounted, would mean that the deterrent had not 
worked. There is no need to enumerate the consequences of this 
situation. If, on the other hand, the Soviets prefer the 'graduated 
response', they will begin the war by attacking with conventional 
forces with the possible support of tactical nuclear weapons. The 
United States and the Soviet Union may be extremely reluctant to take 
the fateful steps leading them to consider the possibility of an 
initial strategic nuclear exchange. All the signs are that in order 
to avoid nuclear conflict, both camps will try to achieve a position 
permitting them to win a conventional war waged in part of the 
European theatre, probably Central Europe. The P!esent numerical 
imbalance in favour of the Warsaw Pact as far as conventional weapon• 
are concerned (tanks, divisions, combat aircraft) would rapidly result 
in a defeat for NATO on the ground, if the allies were unable to 
obtain American reinforcements in time. 
The enormous consumption of equipment characteristic of modern 
warLare nece~sitates large quantities of' replacement stocks. During 
the Yom Kippur war, 520 aircraft and.2800 tanks were destroyed 
in ten days. The speed.with which equipment can be transported by air 
but particularly by sea between the United States and Europe will be 
one of the key factors in the outcome of a war which would long 
remain conventional because the two super-powers would both refuse 
to resort to nuclear weapons. 
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Control of the seas is thus still of major importance, for it 
guarantees that the link between far-distant nations which are 
nevertheless allies in the same alliance cannot be broken by an 
enemy power. An imbalance in naval power between East and West and 
the serious disruption of freedom of movement in the Atlantic as well 
as in the Mediterranean would compromise the ailied nations' chances 
of replying effectively to a conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces. 
If the Allies had insufficient naval power, it might not be feasible 
to use even the NLNS 1 which in turn would compromise the whole 
deterrent strategy. There is a strong possibility that a conventional 
confrontation of the type envisaged in the third scenario would begin 
with a limited confrontation at sea with the purpose of isolating 
Europe from its sources of supply and from its ally on the other side 
of the Atlantic. 
The three scenarios mentioned in this report do not exclude other 
possibilities which could, either directly or indirectly, bring the 
forces of East and West into direct confrontation. 
Moreover, each of the scenarios contains a number of variables 
which increase the uncertainty about possible methods of reply, the 
scale of the risk, and the degree of possible 'solidarity between 
Europe and the United States. 
Like any hypothesis, this study inevitably contains generalizations. 
Its only aim is to make European public opinion aware of how important 
it is for Member States to take joint responsibility for their security, 
outside the zone covered by the Alliance, at a time when their 
dependence and threats to their supplies are increasing. It is time 
for us all to consider the price we must pay for our freedom and in 
order to guarantee the continuation of the conditions upon which our 
spiritual values and material benefits depend. 
1Missile-launching nuclear submarines which require protection. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doc. 1-119/80) 
tabled by Mr d'Ormesson, Mr Blumenfeld, Mr Bersani, Mr SChall and 
Mr Penders, on behalf of the Group of the European Pe~le's Party (C-D Group), 
and by Mr de Courcy Ling and Mr Hutton, on behalf of tbe Jilw:opean Democratic 
Group 
with request for early vote pursuant to Rule 47(5) of the Rules of Procedure 
to wind up the debate on oral question 1-30/80 rev. on the sux:veillance and 
protection of shipping routes for supplies of energy and strAtegic materials 
to the countries of the European Community 
The European Parliament, 
i.. 
! 
1. Is fully aware of the high degree of dependence ot'i the EEC which is 
obliged to import most of the oil and raw materials it consumes. from 
third countries, almost all such imports being transported by sea: 
2. Is pert~r.bed by the vulnerability of its sea links with Africa, the 
Persian Gulf and South America since the North Atlantic Treaty does 
not cover areas south of the Tropic of cancer in which ~he incr~asing 
strength of the Soviet navy presents a growing threat~ 
3. Points out that freedo~ of movement by sea is vital to the econ~ies 
of both the EEC countries and the third world countries with which they 
maintain relations and whose economic developll'lent depends on their 
ability to export: 
4. Calls on the community institutions to invite the Member States with 
naval forces to coordinate their patrols and boost their ship-
building industries. 
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